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SACRIFICING PATIENTS FOR PROFITS:
PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE AND
ERISA FIDUCIARY DUTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of the rising cost of health care in the United States has been
well documented.1 In the coming years, the aging American population,
technological advancement, and rising public expectations of health care will
all contribute to continuing increases in medical costs.2 As a result, increased
attention has been focused on the proper allocation of limited health care
resources3 and the proper decisionmakers for those allocations.4 In an attempt
to limit the rise of health care costs and encourage cost-conscious
decisionmaking, many Managed Care Organizations (“MCOs”)5 have
instituted plans giving physicians a role in rationing health care by creating
financial incentives for them to limit care.6
A physician’s appointed role of gatekeeper7 contrasts with a physician’s
1. Health care spending in the United States outpaces that of other industrialized countries.
“Health care now accounts for about 12% of the gross national product (GNP) of the United States and
is expected to climb to 16% by the year 2000.” Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physicians, Cost Control, and
Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 920 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
2. See David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1713 (1992). If health care costs continue to rise at the current rate, they will reach nearly one-
third of the GNP by the year 2030. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and
Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J.
1297 (1994).
3. Although the rising costs of health care have focused attention on the allocation of health
care and services, this problem is certainly not a new concern. “No nation is wealthy enough to supply
all the care that is technically feasible and desirable; no nation can provide ‘presidential medicine’ for
all its citizens.” Victor R. Fuchs, The “Rationing” of Medical Care, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572
(1984).
4. The person or entity who makes decisions concerning allocation of health care services in an
individual case serves as a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper enforces allocation decisions by allowing or
denying access to services by individual patients. The physician, patient, health care payer, or third
party, alone or in combination, may play the role of gatekeeper. See David Orentlicher, Paying
Physicians More To Do Less: Financial Incentives To Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 165-73
(1996).
5. MCOs include Health Maintenance Organizations [hereinafter HMOs], Preferred Provider
Organizations [hereinafter PPOs], and a variety of other health care providers. Like traditional
insurance, managed care plans offer a range of medical services to their insureds, who pay a monthly
rate. The common feature of all managed care delivery systems is that they control the cost of health
care by exerting either direct or indirect control over the delivery of services. See E. Haavi Morreim,
Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Patients into Alignment, WIDENER L.
SYMP. J., Spring 1996, at 89.
6. These plans vary widely. See infra note 36.
7. The term “gatekeeper” refers to the physician’s role in determining the amount and type of
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traditional ethical role of caregiver, solely responsible to the patient and the
patient’s best interests.8 A physician who receives financial incentives to
limit patient care plays dual roles of caregiver and gatekeeper, thus facing a
conflict of interest. In the role of caregiver, a physician remains bound by the
traditional ethical duty to provide quality patient care. As a gatekeeper,
however, a physician is motivated by a desire to limit patient care by making
fewer referrals to specialists, ordering fewer laboratory tests, and eliminating
expensive tests and treatments.9 This conflict between a physician’s ethical
responsibility to patients and financial self-interest endangers patients by
potentially denying them rightful access to life-saving medical
interventions.10
Cynthia Herdrich is one such patient whose physician’s financial self-
interest displaced her medical needs.11 On March 1, 1991, Herdrich
experienced pain in her groin and went to her physican, Lori Pegram.12 Six
days later, at a second exam, Dr. Pegram discovered an inflamed mass in
Herdrich’s abdomen.13 Herdrich’s health plan required patients in “non-
emergency” situations to receive care from facilities owned by the plan.14
Herdrich’s health plan classified her condition as a “non-emergency,” and
required her to wait eight days for an ultrasound at a plan-owned facility fifty
miles from her neighborhood hospital.15 While Herdrich was waiting for this
procedure, her appendix ruptured, causing a life-threatening condition called
peritonitis and necessitating surgery.16
Herdrich filed a medical negligence suit in Illinois state court against her
health care offered. Commonly, MCOs require insured patients to obtain a referral from their primary-
care physician in order to qualify for certain diagnostic tests, treatment options, or care from a
specialist.
8. See Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor’s Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1984)
(“[P]hysicians are required to do everything that they believe may benefit each patient without regard
to costs or other societal considerations.”).
9. A conservative formulation of traditional medical ethics would not allow any competing
interests to interfere with the physicians’ complete allegiance to their patients’ best interests. Under
this view, physicians have a duty to provide the best possible health care without regard for any
competing considerations, especially physicians’ self-interest.
10. Impaired medical decisionmaking affects patients in two ways. First, individual patients may
suffer if they are incorrectly denied medical services by a gatekeeping physician acting in his or her
financial self-interest. Second, when individual patients are denied care, all patients may suffer from a
reduction in the general standard of care.
11. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 10 (U.S. Sept.
28, 1999)(No. 98-2043).
12. See id. at 365 n.1.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 374.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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physician, Dr. Pegram, and her health plan provider, Carle Clinic Association
(“Carle”).17 She later amended her complaint to include two counts of state
law fraud against Carle and Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc.
(“HAMP”),18 an HMO which contracted with Carle to provide medical
services to its members.19 The defendants successfully argued that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempted the fraud
claims, and removed the action to federal court.20 The federal district judge
granted summary judgment on one count,21 and granted Herdrich leave to
amend her complaint to state a cause of action under ERISA.22 Herdrich’s
amended complaint alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
the beneficiaries of the plan by providing inadequate health care to
beneficiaries and profiting in the amount of unpaid supplemental medical
expense payments.23
The district court dismissed Herdrich’s ERISA-based complaint for
failure to state a claim.24 Herdrich’s medical negligence claims against Dr.
17. See id. at 365.
18. See id. at 366. Count III, the first of the fraud causes of action, alleged that Carle failed to
disclose material facts relating to the ownership of HAMP and failed to disclose “that the
compensation of plan physicians was increased to the extent that they did not order diagnostic tests,
utilized facilities owned by the physicians, and did not make emergency or consultation referrals.” Id.
at 366 n.2. Count III alleged a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/1 et seq. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 366 n.2. “Count IV alleged that HAMP breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by increasing its profits and the profits of its contracted physicians through
minimizing the use of diagnostic tests, emergency consultation referrals, and facilities not owned by
such physicians, all to the detriment of plan beneficiaries.” Id.
19. The court did not clearly define the relationships between Carle Clinic Association, HAMP,
and a third defendant, Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. See id. at 363. It is apparent,
however, that some or all of the physicians who formed Carle Clinic Association owned all three of
the companies, and that together these three companies offered and provided medical services. It can
be gathered from the opinion that “(1) HAMP is an HMO that was owned and controlled by the
physicians comprising the Carle Clinic, (2) that HAMP had a contract with Carle pursuant to which
Carle’s physicians were to provide covered medical services to HAMP members, and (3) that Dr.
Pegram, plaintiff’s treating physician, was employed by Carle.” Daly D.E. Temchine, Seventh
Circuit’s ERISA Fiduciary Duty Ruling Is Example of Judicial Activism, 7 HEALTH L. REP. 1421
(1998).
20. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 366. ERISA, enacted by Congress in 1974, governs all benefit
plans sponsored by employers. In the area of employee benefits, ERISA broadly preempts state law.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Because Herdrich’s health coverage was part of an employee benefit
plan sponsored by her husband’s employer, State Farm Insurance Company, the coverage was subject
to ERISA.
21. The district court “granted summary judgment against Herdrich on Count IV ‘to the extent
[she] relies on § 502(a)(3)(B) [of ERISA] as a basis for monetary relief, as opposed to equitable
relief.’” 154 F.3d at 366.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 367. The parties agreed to have their case assigned to a magistrate judge. The
magistrate recommended dismissal of the amended Count III because it did not identify how the
defendants were fiduciaries with respect to the plan. See id. The judge denied Herdrich’s Rule 72
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1343+note+Pinto.doc 03/22/00   9:31 AM
1326 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1323
Pegram and Carle Clinic Association went to trial, and a jury awarded
Herdrich $35,000 in compensatory damages.25 Herdrich appealed the
dismissal of her ERISA-based claim.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s dismissal of Herdrich’s ERISA claim, holding that Herdrich
properly stated a claim by alleging that “the defendants’ incentive system
depleted plan resources so as to benefit physicians who, coincidentally,
administered the Plan, possibly to the detriment of their patients.”27 This
decision is the first to hold that physician incentives to limit care constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.28
The breach of fiduciary duty recognized by the Herdrich court creates a
powerful tool for ensuring that MCOs will not sacrifice patient care in their
pursuit of profit maximization. This judicial response protects the public
from physician incentives that threaten the quality of medical care, while
compensating plaintiffs injured as a result of these profit-maximization
schemes. Further, this response effectuates the legislative purpose of ERISA
to protect participants and beneficiaries under employer-sponsored programs
from inefficient or dishonest plan administration.29 Finally, while state
medical malpractice law compensates patients injured by flawed medical
decisions, currently no law compensates patients injured by flawed decision-
making processes.
This Note explores the possibilities of an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty
cause of action to control the use of physician incentives in managed care.
Part II argues that physician incentives create ethical questions, cause
conflicts of interest, and compromise patient care. Part III contends that a
successful ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty, as in Herdrich, ensures
objection to the magistrate’s recommendation, but gave her leave to replead her ERISA claim.
Hendrich did not replead, but instead stood on Count III as amended. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 380. The Court of Appeals remanded to the federal district court for a trial on the
merits. See id. Judge Flaum dissented and filed an opinion in which he disagreed with the majority’s
handling of the case in several respects but added:
I would not rule out the possibility that the imposition of incentives to limit care could support a
claim of breach of fiduciary duty when there is a serious flaw in the manner in which the incentive
arrangement is established or a significant limitation on the ability of plan sponsors to obtain
alternative arrangements in the market.
Id. at 384 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
28. Herdrich is the first case to hold that a scheme of physician incentives, in and of itself, may
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. It is not, however, the first to find a violation of ERISA in
connection with physician incentives. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
29. See Howard Shapiro et al., ERISA Preemption: To Infinity and Beyond and Back Again? (A
Historical Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence), 58 LA. L. REV. 997 (1998).
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that MCOs remain accountable to their participants and beneficiaries in
controlling medical costs.
II. PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES
The use of physician incentives emerged as a cost-saving innovation of
the managed care industry.30 Before the advent of managed care, fee-for-
service medicine comprised the norm. In fee-for-service, patients, through a
private indemnity insurer or the government, pay physicians for each service
provided. The fee-for-service system offers patients freedom to select
physicians and treatment options, while providing physicians complete
control over clinical decisions and costs.31 Meanwhile, the private insurer or
the government has little or no control over patient care decisions.32 The fee-
for-service system contributed to the rise in health care expenditures because
neither the insured patient nor the physician has incentives to limit costs.33 In
fact, because physicians receive payment regardless of the necessity of each
service, the fee-for-service system motivates physicians to provide more care
than medically necessary.34
Managed care in the United States arose in the 1970s in response to
30. The dramatic growth of managed care has forced important changes in the economic
structure of the health care industry. See generally MANAGED CARE AND CHANGING HEALTH CARE
MARKETS (Michael A. Morrisey ed., 1998). Price competition has lead to a restructuring of the
market.
[M]ore and more physicians are practicing in large groups rather than singly, and are often
associated with hospitals which, in turn, are becoming a part of large hospital systems. These
integrated health care systems are competing with one another on price and quality to a greater
degree than ever before in the United States.
John W. Pollard, Quality in Managed Care: A Medical Perspective, in ACHIEVING QUALITY IN
MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAW 21, 23 (John D. Blum ed., 1997).
31. See Ryan Steven Johnson, Note, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty To Disclose
Physician Incentives to Limit Health Care, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (1998).
32. The private insurer or the government exerts some degree of control by limiting the scope of
the policy to exclude such things as “mental health, dentistry, outpatient prescription drugs, and
podiatry.” Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1715.
33. In fee-for-service medicine, physicians and patients have exclusive control over the choice of
medical options, while the payer has exclusive responsibility for its costs. Consumption of medical
services remains completely independent from and unaffected by consideration of costs. Thus, fee-for-
service medicine is a free-for-all, in which patients’ access to care is determined solely by their
insurance coverage, and it is impossible to implement broader societal judgments about the proper
allocation of health care spending. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 158.
34. In traditional fee-for-service medicine, as in managed care, a conflict may exist between the
best interests of the patient and the physician’s financial self-interest. In the case of fee-for-service
medicine, however, limiting cost is usually not a factor in the decisionmaking of either the patient or
the physician. As a result, although patients may receive more care than is medically necessary, they
are unlikely to be refused medically beneficial services. Thus, it is the payer (usually the insurer or the
government) who is most likely to suffer from the physician’s conflict of interest.
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growing concerns about the fee-for-service system and escalating medical
expenditures.35 Although MCOs exist in a number of forms, each offers a
hybrid package of health insurance and health care delivery.36 Because the
payment and delivery of health care are linked, the MCO can control costs by
exerting direct or indirect control over patient care alternatives.37 For
example, MCOs may limit costs by restricting a patient’s choice of
physicians, specialist consultations and diagnostic and treatment options.38
Although it is a fairly recent innovation, managed care has quickly grown
to dominate the health care industry. In 1997, an estimated seventy-three
percent of American workers received their health care through some type of
managed care system.39 Enrollment in HMOs increases at a rate of ten to
fifteen percent annually.40 Further, approximately sixty percent of physicians
received at least a portion of their income from a contractual relationship
with an HMO.41 The omnipresence of managed care has fundamentally
impacted the structure, institutions, and costs of health care.42
35. See, e.g., Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400-01 (1996); Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal
Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed
Care Organizations, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 213 (1997). Managed care has seen dramatic
growth in the past 15 years. In 1985, only 7.5% of insured workers received their medical coverage
through a managed care organization. See Michael A. Morrisey, Introduction, in MANAGED CARE AND
CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS, supra note 30, at 1. By 1995, that number had jumped to 73%.
See id.
36. Managed care includes a variety of combinations of insurer and provider. HMOs are health
care plans that provide a range of health care benefits for a fixed, prepaid premium. An HMO that
owns hospitals and clinics and employs health care professionals is called a staff-model HMO. A PPO
is a health plan that contracts with a network of hospitals, physicians and other health care providers to
furnish a comprehensive package of benefits. When plan members use a provider outside of the
network, the plan reimburses only a portion of their costs. While HMOs and PPOs are currently the
most common incarnations of MCOs, the managed care industry has created many other
organizational forms in an attempt to contain costs by effective management and risk-shifting. See
generally Orentlicher, supra note 4. Recently there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
employers who contract directly with health care providers in physician practice networks. See Linda
H. Lamel, Significance of Risk in Direct Contracts with Health Providers, in ACHIEVING QUALITY IN
MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 79.
37. See Morreim, supra note 5, at 89 (defining “managed care” as “a health care delivery system
that attempts to control the cost of care by controlling the provision of services”).
38. The restriction of services may be through rule-based decisionmaking where, for instance,
only the least expensive of several treatment options is available for a given condition; through
utilization review, where an agent of the MCO must preapprove patient services or through cost-
conscious decisionmaking by the primary-care physician who determines the range of options open to
a given patient. See generally Frankel, supra note 2.
39. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 1638.
40. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 157.
41. See id.
42. See supra note 28. While managed care has focused attention on health care rationing,
payment decisions of government programs also significantly influence the allocation of health
services. For example, in the post-war period, “[n]ew medical care financing made available by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/9
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MCOs limit costs by controlling access to services at three levels:
administration, physician, and patient. At the administrative level, MCOs
often limit costs through rule-based decisionmaking.43 At the physician level,
MCOs limit costs by enabling primary-care physicians to play gatekeeping
roles in determining which services should be available to patients.44 At the
patient level, MCOs limit costs by encouraging patients to limit their own
care through co-payments.45 At each level, MCOs encourage cost-conscious
decisionmaking through financial incentives and risk-shifting. At the
physician level, three primary forms of financial incentives limit care—
capitation, salary, and withholding agreements.46
Capitation shifts the risks involved in health insurance from the MCO to
physicians or physician groups by compensating them a single pre-
determined amount per patient per time period, regardless of the amount or
type of care actually provided.47 Depending on the agreement, primary-care
physicians may assume costs of referrals, laboratory tests, and hospital
services.48 Physicians profit in a capitation arrangement by minimizing the
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs altered the supply of services. These programs
were biased toward the reimbursement of technical procedures, in contrast to providing cognitive and
counseling services characteristic of primary care.” Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1717.
43. For example, two drugs are available for patients with myocardial infarction who need
thrombolytic therapy. One, called tissue plasminogen-activator [hereinafter tPA] seems to be slightly
more effective but costs ten times as much as the alternative, steptokinase. See Morreim, supra note 5,
at 112 n.73. Thus, one MCO allows the use of tPA “to dissolve blood clots only in patients who have
large anterior myocardial infarctions and are under 75.” Id. (quoting Ken Terry, Technology: The
Biggest Health-Care Cost-Driver of All, MED. ECON., Mar. 21, 1994, at 124, 132).
44. Many observers favor physician gatekeeping over rule-based decisionmaking because it
allows physicians to make determinations based on their patients’ unique circumstances. In addition,
no systematic set of rules can cover every conceivable patient scenario, so rule-based decisionmaking
can at best be somewhat limited in scope. See Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 713 (1994) (noting that physician-based rationing of health care “permits the
denial of marginally beneficial treatment only where doing so is consistent with the prevailing
standard of care and thus does not constitute malpractice”).
45. MCOs rarely exploit this option because studies have shown that patients who limit their own
care reduce both medically nonbeneficial and beneficial care and wait longer to receive medical
attention for health problems. See Morreim, supra note 5, at 105. In addition, “copayment . . . deters
the poor from seeking care to a greater extent than the affluent, even though poverty is associated with
more illness and a greater need for care.” Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1719.
46. See Hall, supra note 44, at 758-59.
47. See generally Frances H. Miller, Capitation & Physician Autonomy: Master of the Universe
or Just Another Prisoner’s Dilemma? (What Can Britain’s National Health Service Experience Teach
Us?), 6 HEALTH MATRIX 89 (1996).
48. See id. at 94-95. Miller explains:
At the simplest level, physicians can be capitated solely for delivering their own services. In such
situations, they usually contract with insurers to provide whatever care (within their medical
competence) patients require during a given period of time, in return for a set total fee. A more
complex arrangement would capitate a primary-care doctor for all physician services needed by a
particular patient, whether provided personally or by other professionals.
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cost of each individual patient, thereby maximizing the amount by which the
capitation payment exceeds the cost of care.49
Another physician-level financial incentive, paying physicians a salary,
saves costs by motivating physicians to limit care in order to maximize their
own free time.50 Normally each physician maintains a certain number of
patients. Physicians therefore have an incentive to minimize the time spent
on each patient in order to maximize the amount of time available to pursue
other professional or personal interests.51
The third physician-level financial incentive, a withholding agreement,
often operates in conjunction with capitation and salary to limit patient access
to outside services such as specialists, hospital services, and diagnostic and
treatment procedures.52 Such withholding agreements directly reward
physicians for providing fewer referrals and other specialized services. In one
form of withholding agreement, MCOs create a “risk pool” from a
percentage of each physician’s capitation payment; this “risk pool” pays for
referrals and other additional services.53 At the end of the accounting period,
participating physicians receive as a bonus a distribution of surplus funds in
the risk pool. In some withholding arrangements, physicians must
compensate the MCO for any deficit in the risk pool at the end of the
accounting period.54
Id.
49. Physicians that provide some or all of their services under capitation agreements have
incentives to maximize profit in two ways. First, they serve their own financial interests by spending
less time and money on individual patients and by restricting access to specialized services. Second,
because the MCO compensates the physician a set amount per patient, capitated physicians have an
incentive to increase the number of patients covered under the capitation agreements. Each of these
incentives may lead to a reduction in the standard of care.
50. Salaried physicians are the hallmark of a staff-model HMO, which is a specific type of MCO
that owns hospitals and clinics and employs health care professionals. See generally Orentlicher, supra
note 4. Kaiser Health Care is one example of a staff-model HMO.
51. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 159. Orentlicher explains the differing effects of salary and
capitation. Salaried physicians have personal incentives to limit the number of patients they serve in
order to increase their free time, while physicians who provide services on a capitation basis have
incentive to maximize the number of patients they serve in order to increase their personal income. See
id.
52. MCOs impose various incentives to limit access to outside services. A capitation agreement
that requires capitated physicians to be responsible not only for primary care but also laboratory,
specialist, and/or hospital services is one way to minimize use of these benefits. Alternatively, if the
MCO is responsible for payment of outside services it may discourage the use of these services by
offering financial rewards to primary-care physicians who make fewer referrals and imposing penalties
on those who over-utilize specialized care.
53. These withholding agreements typically constitute from 10% to 30% of the physician’s
capitation amount, and 20% is most common. See Hall, supra note 44, at 773-74.
54. Stop-loss protection moderates the risk assumed by physician groups in both capitation and
withholding agreement arrangements. Although the form varies, it generally ensures that the physician
group will not suffer losses greater than a given amount either for a single patient or across all patients
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Many commentators favor physician incentives. Physician incentives to
limit care and other cost-cutting techniques instituted by the managed care
industry have successfully limited the costs of health care.55 Many
commentators argue that physician incentives are crucial to managing the
costs of health care by making physicians responsible for the cost-sensitivity
of their decisions.56 As one commentator asks, “[w]hy should health care
providers be exempt from this entirely common and appropriate concern of
professionals, service providers and manufacturers?”57 In addition,
physicians have always acted as patients’ access point for available health
care alternatives, and thus already function as de facto gatekeepers.58 Under
traditional fee-for-service medicine, physicians receive incentives to become
“factitious gatekeepers”59 because they directly profit from ordering more
tests and procedures. Therefore, commentators argue that MCO financial
incentives reverse the bias of fee-for-service medicine by eliminating
incentives for waste and substituting incentives for thrift.60
Additionally, many argue that while physicians are not ideally situated to
assume roles as restrictive gatekeepers,61 they are nonetheless better situated
than the alternatives.62 Presumably, physicians are best situated to make
in a certain time period. Stop-loss protection is required for Medicare and Medicaid providers when
the physician or physician group faces “significant financial risk,” as determined by amount and
immediacy of risk. See id. at 775.
55. One study found that increased enrollment in managed care has led to an overall reduction in
the growth of medical spending. See DAVID M. CUTLER & LOUISE SHEINER, MANAGED CARE AND
THE GROWTH OF MEDICAL EXPENDITURES 102 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
Series No. 6140, 1997). From 1960 to 1990, per capita medical expenditures increased about 5% per
year. See id. at 3. Since 1992, this rate of expansion has slowed significantly. Medical expenditures
increased by 1.5% in 1994, and by 2.1% in 1995. See id. at 3-4. The authors theorize that the reduction
in costs in the current managed care-dominated health care industry results from three factors. First,
MCOs have the necessary leverage to negotiate reductions in the cost of services. See id. at 5. Second,
by excluding experimental treatments from their range of services, MCOs reduce the growth of
medical technology. See id. at 6. Finally, the managed care industry has saved money by reducing the
quantity of services provided to their beneficiaries by limiting access to specialists, reducing the length
of hospital stays and restricting consumption of medical services in other ways. See id. at 5-6.
56. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 4; see also Hall, supra note 44.
57. Temchine, supra note 19, at 1424.
58. See Sulmasy, supra note 1, at 923. Physicians are de facto gatekeepers because they “actually
control the supply and can influence the demand for medical interventions.” Id.
59. “[T]hat is, to order unnecessary tests and treatments in order to generate a profit.” Id.
60. See, e.g., Temchine, supra note 19, at 1424.
61. A restrictive gatekeeper participates in restrictive allocations of health care by reducing
patient access to specialized services. The phrase “restrictive gatekeeper” comes from Sulmasy, supra
note 1, at 921.
62. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Alternative restrictive gatekeeping
mechanisms include central administrative decisionmaking by the MCO and patient-motivated
reduction in services through the use of co-payments. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 172, 188-89.
Physicians are well situated to make rationing decisions because they “will know much of the
information about the benefits, risks and costs of treatment relevant to making the rationing decisions
Washington University Open Scholarship
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diagnostic and treatment judgments because they are most familiar with their
individual patients and their patients’ unique medical and personal
situations.63 Thus, restricting medical care at the physician level promotes
patient care by avoiding imprecise, generalized decisions by administrators
unfamiliar with individual patients.64
Despite these practical arguments in favor of physician incentives,
traditional medical ethics staunchly oppose them.65 Simply put, traditional
ethics dictate that “physicians are required to do everything that they believe
may benefit each patient without regard to costs or other societal
considerations.”66 The American Medical Association and the American
College of Physicians take the position that the patients’ interests should
remain paramount, and financial incentives should not compromise a
physician’s ability to advocate for patients.67 Two principle concerns underlie
before them.” Id. at 173.
63. A related argument in favor of physician incentives emphasizes that incentives provide
greater clinical autonomy in allowing physicians broader range for their decisionmaking. See Miller,
supra note 47, at 97.
64. See Hall, supra note 44, at 702-03. While individual physicians ideally are best able to assess
the needs of their patients, their medical decisions are influenced by their own personal judgments
about their patients and tend to vary widely among physicians. For example, Hall says that “there is
reason to believe that physician rationers will tend to favor more articulate, higher-educated patients
who are better equipped to voice their demands, and that they will devote disproportionate time to
high-visibility ‘dread’ diseases or those that command their individual research or intellectual
interests.” Id. at 715.
65. See generally For Our Patients, Not for Profits: A Call to Action, 278 JAMA 1733 (1997). A
large group of Massachusetts physicians and nurses signed an open letter in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, affirming five basic tenets, including “[p]ursuit of corporate profit and
personal fortune have no place in caregiving,” and “[p]otent financial incentives that reward overcare
or undercare weaken patient-physician and patient-nurse bonds and should be prohibited.” Id. at 1733.
66. Levinsky, supra note 8, at 1573. Levinsky argues that the physician’s duty to his patient as an
advocate remains absolute and, therefore, cannot be compromised by any other considerations,
including the needs of other patients or society in general. See id. at 1573-75.
67. See Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar. 1, 1994, at 28, 33. The AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics state “under no
circumstances may the physician place his own financial interest above the welfare of his patients. . . .
If a conflict develops between the physician’s financial interest and the physician’s responsibilities to
the patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patient’s benefit.” CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: INCLUDING
THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND RULES OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, Opinion 8.07 (AMA 1986). Likewise, the American College of Physicians’ manual states:
“The physician must avoid any personal commercial conflict of interest that might compromise his
loyalty and treatment of the patient.” Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Ethics, American College of
Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual Part I: History of Medical Ethics, The
Physician and the Patient, The Physician’s Relationship to Other Physicians, The Physician and
Society, in 101 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 129, 134 (1984). However, while neither seems to
advocate a blanket prohibition on physician incentives, neither clearly delineates the point at which
physician incentives compromise physicians’ paramount duty to their patients. See Gregory D. Jones,
Note, Primum Non Nocere: The Expanding “Honest Services” Mail Fraud Statute and the Physician-
Patient Fiduciary Relationship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 139, 163-65 (1998).
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this distrust of physician incentives— damage to the essential trust in
physician-patient relationships and jeopardized patient care.
Trust is crucial to the physician-patient relationship because of the
disparity of knowledge and dependence inherent in the relationship;
physicians act as the exclusive source of expertise and help for sick,
vulnerable patients.68 When physicians function as restrictive gatekeepers as
a result of their own self-interest, the trust between physician and patient
erodes.69 Disruption of trust could lead to lower quality care if it dissuades
patients from seeking medical attention early or from following the advice of
their physicians.
Patient care might suffer in other ways. In Great Britain, where physicians
act as restrictive gatekeepers, evidence shows the standard of care declining
as physicians justify their cost-cutting decisions by changing their definitions
of medically necessary care.70 As physicians differ in their personal
judgments about cost-cutting, the standard of care will vary widely as well.71
When a physician bears responsibility only to patients, the physician remains
free to act as a knowledgeable, skilled, and trustworthy advocate in
delivering to the patient the best care available. More importantly, the
physician remains free to advocate for the patient when the MCO offers
insufficient care.
Recognizing the dangers of physician incentives to limit care, Congress
limited physician incentives in health care plans that provide services to
Medicare and Medicaid recipients.72 These controls prohibit “specific
payment . . . under the plan to a physician or physician group as an
68. See Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of
Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 734 (1985-86) (“The
nature of the material over which the physician has control is both personal and technologically
sophisticated, which creates an imbalance between physician and patient”).
69. See Sulmasy, supra note 1, at 1922. Sulmasy presents the example of a patient who would
benefit from having oxygen at home, but whose physician determines that it is not medically necessary
and thus, functions as a restrictive gatekeeper. See id. “An honest doctor might say . . . , ‘No, you can’t
have oxygen at home because I need the money to send my children to college.’ A less honest
physician might say ‘Oxygen won’t help you.’” Id. Both of these options create disruption of the
physician-patient relationship. See id.
70. See Levinsky, supra note 8, at 1574. In Britain “physicians ‘seem to seek medical
justification for decisions forced on them by resource limits. Doctors gradually redefine standards of
care so that they can escape the constant recognition that financial limits compel them to do less than
their best.’” Id. (quoting H.J. AARON & W.B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING
HOSPITAL CARE (1984)).
71. The standard of care may vary not only among physicians but among patients as well. See
Hall, supra note 44.
72. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)-(B) (Supp.
V 1993). See also Hall, supra note 44, at 772-76 (discussing federal regulation of physician incentives
under Medicare). These controls do not affect private health plans.
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inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services provided with
respect to a specific individual.”73 This element of the limitations only
applies to incentives directed at specific payments.74 Congress broadened the
limitation, however, by regulating physician incentives that create
“substantial financial risk,”75 as when a capitation agreement imposes a large
risk for many patients spread among few physicians.76 No similar controls
affect private health plans, and no widely recognized cause of action exists
for patients who have been injured by excessive physician incentive
programs.
III. ERISA AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. ERISA
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) in 1974 primarily to create minimum standards for the protection
of employee pension benefits.77 ERISA applies to all benefit programs of all
employers who engage in interstate commerce, including most employer-
sponsored health care plans.78 Congress intended both to protect beneficiaries
of employer sponsored plans by improving the financial stability of those
plans and to create “a uniform set of federal rules that would ease their
administration and minimize unanticipated expenses. State-based claims
against benefit plans were thereby preempted in favor of purely federal
causes and remedies.”79
ERISA broadly preempts state laws, “supersed[ing] any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”80
Courts have interpreted this to include claims against MCOs for denial of
benefits but not claims against physicians for medical malpractice.81 For
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
74. See Hall, supra note 44, at 775.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii).
76. The amount of risk assumed by a physician group in a capitation agreement is a function of
the number and type of services which the physicians are responsible for providing, the number of
capitated patients, and the number of participating physicians.
77. See Clifford A. Cantor, Fiduciary Liability in Emerging Health Care, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J.
189, 189 (1997).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (1994).
79. E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans: Diminishing Deference to Fiduciaries
and an Emerging Problem for Provider-Sponsored Organizations, 65 TENN. L. REV. 511, 512 (1998).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
81. See Robert A. Clifford, Physician’s Liability in a Managed Care Environment, 10 HEALTH
LAW. 5, 8 (1997). There are two reasons that ERISA preempts state law related MCO administration
but not physician negligence. First, malpractice claims against physicians are too tenuously related to
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example, in Herdrich, Cynthia Herdrich received a jury verdict on a state law
medical malpractice claim but ERISA preempted her state law fraud claim,
forcing her to replead her claim in federal court.82
ERISA’s broad preemption means that regulation of MCO incentive
plans must take place at the federal level. If the ERISA fiduciary duty fails to
encompass a prohibition on excessive physician incentives, Congress must
implement such a prohibition.
B. Existing Duties: The Duty to Inform
In Shea v. Esensten,83 the Eighth Circuit held that an HMO had a
fiduciary duty84 under ERISA to disclose a physician incentive structure.85
During an overseas business trip, Patrick Shea was hospitalized with severe
chest pains.86 When he returned home, he made several visits to his family
physician, who was aware of Mr. Shea’s family history of heart disease.87
Despite Mr. Shea’s warning signs of chest pains, shortness of breath, muscle
tingling, and dizziness, his physician said that a “referral to a cardiologist was
unnecessary.”88 Mr. Shea even offered to pay for a cardiologist on his own,
but his physician persuaded him that the forty-year-old Shea was “too young
and did not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a cardiologist.”89 A
few months later, Mr. Shea died of heart failure.90 In her complaint against
the HMO, Mr. Shea’s widow alleged a breach of fiduciary duty for the
HMO’s failure to disclose that it offered financial incentives for physicians to
limit care.91 She further claimed that if their HMO would have informed
them of the physician incentives, they would have chosen to seek a
the employee benefits plan to fall under ERISA. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100
n.21 (1983). Second, if ERISA preempted state medical malpractice law, MCOs would enjoy a
protected status that would be unique in the law, and “never contemplated by Congress.” United Wire,
Metal and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Mem’l Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1194 (3d
Cir. 1993).
82. 154 F.3d 362, 365.
83. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
84. For a discussion of fiduciary duty under ERISA, see infra notes 103-09.
85. See 107 F.3d at 629.
86. See id. at 626.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 627. Mr. Shea’s HMO required patients to receive a written referral from their
primary-care physician before consulting with a specialist. See id. The HMO utilized a cost-saving
device whereby “the primary care doctors were rewarded for not making covered referrals to
specialists, and were docked a portion of their fees if they made too many.” Id.
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cardiologist on their own.92
In holding that Mr. Shea’s HMO had a duty to disclose its incentive
arrangement the court relied in part on the Supreme Court decision in Varity
Corporation v. Howe.93 In Varity Corporation, the Supreme Court held that
section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, which “requires a ‘fiduciary’ to ‘discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries,’” codifies the common law of trusts’ duty of loyalty.94 The
common law of trusts imposes broad disclosure requirements,95 and the
Supreme Court easily could have held that this included the “material fact” of
physician incentives. The Shea decision has stirred up much debate, but it
remains to be seen whether other circuits will follow the Eighth Circuit’s lead
in imposing upon HMOS a fiduciary duty to disclose financial incentives for
physicians.96
C. The Cause of Action
As forward-looking as ERISA was at the time it was written, it does not
specifically address the unique problems raised by the managed care
industry.97 At the same time, ERISA preempts state law on fraud and agency
as they relate to managed care. The combination of these two factors has left
the cost-cutting innovations devised by the managed care industry
“ungoverned and ungovernable,” denying beneficiaries any protection from
the allocation decisions and mechanisms of their health plan and providers.
Congress has not specifically limited physician incentives in private
92. See id.
93. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). See 107 F.3d at 628.
94. 516 U.S. at 506 (quoting ERISA § 404(a)(1)). The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
what constitutes the proper scope of the duty of loyalty. See id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Varity Corp., affirmed by the Supreme Court, however, held that “the duty of loyalty
requires an ERISA fiduciary to communicate any material facts which could adversely affect a plan
member’s interests.” Shea, 107 F.3d at 628 (citing Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir.
1994)).
95. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 1645. Common law typically does not impose an affirmative
duty of disclosure on fiduciaries, absent direct inquiry. Id. “The common law does recognize, however,
an affirmative duty when the trustee possesses superior knowledge of certain information that the
beneficiary needs to know to protect her interests.” Id.
96. Other courts have addressed the extent of ERISA fiduciary duty in the context of physician
incentive schemes. In Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of New York, 114 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997), the
Second Circuit seemed to accept Shea’s rationale in holding that fiduciary duty is not breached when a
beneficiary has full knowledge of changes in the incentive structure of her health plan. However, the
Southern District of New York expressly rejected Shea in Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F.
Supp. 748, 755 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
97. See Shapiro, supra note 29. ERISA’s preemption provision provides that “[t]he provisions of
. . . [ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
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health care. However, logic and equity justify expanding ERISA’s fiduciary
duty requirements to impose a duty on MCOs to ensure that physician
incentives do not compromise patient care. Further, recognition that
physician incentives can amount to a breach of the MCO’s fiduciary duty is
necessary both to protect the public from ethically questionable practices and
to compensate injured plaintiffs.
The extension of liability to MCOs for physician incentive plans is
consistent with the legislative intent of ERISA. Through ERISA, Congress
intended to protect participants and beneficiaries of employee-sponsored
plans from “perceived abuses involving the management of funds
accumulated to finance various types of benefit plans.”98 In the era of
indemnity insurance and fee-for-service medicine, Congress could not have
envisioned the specific provisions required to protect consumers of managed
health care from cost-saving innovations that endanger patients and
compromise their quality of care. With proper judicial interpretation,
however, ERISA’s broad definitions of fiduciary99 and fiduciary duty100 can
adequately effectuate Congressional intent in the context of managed care.
Existing legal mechanisms insufficiently protect patients in managed care
from excessive physician incentive programs. State malpractice claims may
compensate injured plaintiffs for flawed medical decisions. The flawed
decision-making process that endangered these plaintiffs, however, is beyond
the grasp of current law. ERISA broadly preempts state fraud and agency
law, but ERISA itself contains no provisions specifically protecting health
care consumers from MCO abuses.
Opponents of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action in the context of
physician incentives claim either that it is unnecessary or that it prevents
MCOs from controlling costs. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Opponents argue that this cause of action is unnecessary because market
forces adequately control quality within the managed care industry.101 Fierce
98. See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 997.
99. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
101. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1998) (Flaum, J., dissenting). In the
Herdrich dissent, Judge Flaum argued that “market forces help reduce the risk that the fiduciary’s
conflict of interest in making coverage decisions will work to the detriment of the plan and the plan
beneficiaries.” Id. at 381. Judge Flaum further argued that the sponsor of Cynthia Herdrich’s plan,
State Farm, was an experienced consumer of health benefits, stating:
The defendants do have a financial interest in denying coverage . . . [b]ut State Farm has an
interest in ensuring that its employees are satisfied with their fringe benefits, and the defendants
have an interest in ensuring that State Farm is satisfied with the defendants’ performance in
delivering health care to the beneficiaries. In this sense, the interests of the administrator align
with the interests of the beneficiaries and the sponsor.
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competition in the health care industry will force out MCOs offering poor
care, because consumers will choose plans that combine efficient cost control
with quality health care. This argument ignores two unique aspects of the
current health care system. First, employees often have little or no choice in
selecting their health plans. Second, patients seldom have the expertise to
know if they are receiving quality care unless the failure to provide adequate
care results in injury.
The argument that a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action would
prevent MCOs from controlling costs is likewise unpersuasive. First, only
excessive, health-endangering physician incentives constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty. Such schemes exceed the range of allowable MCO
innovation. Second, cost management at other levels of the MCO will be
unaffected. Patients benefit when physicians do not bear primary
responsibility for cost control, because this enables physicians to focus their
loyalty and advocacy solely on their patients.
The breach of fiduciary duty cause of action used in Herdrich consists of
three required elements: the defendants must be plan fiduciaries, the
defendants must have breached their fiduciary duties, and there must be a
cognizable loss to the plan.102 The following section considers each element
in turn.
1. Managed Care Organizations are ERISA Fiduciaries
ERISA broadly defines a plan fiduciary,103 providing that a person or
entity is a plan fiduciary “to the extent” that he or she has discretionary
authority or control over either plan management or administration.104
Congress expressed an intent to have “fiduciary” interpreted broadly, and
courts have construed it consistent with this intent.105
Id. at 382.
102. See id. at 369.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). It provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to
the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, . . . or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or responsibility in the
administration of such plan.
Id.
104. See id. See also Robert N. Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, in PENSION PLAN
INVESTMENTS: CONFRONTING TODAY’S ISSUES 9, 13 (Howard Pianko & A. Richard Susko co-chairs,
1998).
105. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 370. The court in Herdrich recited the following statement of the
Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor in 1974:
The Committee has adopted the view that the definition of fiduciary is of necessity broad. . . . A
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The test for determining whether a given person or entity is a fiduciary
with respect to the plan hinges on the person or entity’s “actions, [and] not
the official designation of his role.”106 The Supreme Court adopted this
functional test in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.107 Under the functional test
adopted in Mertens, the Herdrich Court correctly determined that the MCO
was a fiduciary with respect to the plan.108 Indeed, most MCOs maintain
some discretion and control over claims and therefore would be considered
fiduciaries.109
2. Physician Incentives Can Constitute a Breach of Duty
Physician incentives may not only be ethically questionable and
unwise,110 they may also rise to the level of breach of fiduciary duty.111 To
determine when physician incentives cross this fiduciary line, a court must
consider the duties of a fiduciary under ERISA.112 Under ERISA, plan
fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the assets of the plan. . . . Conduct alone may
in appropriate circumstances impose fiduciary obligations. It is the clear intention of the
Committee that any person with a specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to be
a fiduciary.
Id. at 370 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 3977, 3983 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1974) (statement of Chairman of
the House Committee on Education and Labor), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 3309).
106. See Eccles, supra note 104, at 14 (citing Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611, 618
(9th Cir 1991).
107. 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (“[ERISA] “defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal trusteeship,
but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan, . . . thus expanding the universe of
persons subject to fiduciary duties.”).
108. See 154 F.3d at 371. “Herdrich pleaded that the defendants had the exclusive right to decide
all disputed and non-routine claims.” Id. at 370. Herdrich also pleaded that “[u]nder the Plan,
defendants exercise discretionary authority and discretionary control of claims management, property
and asset management, and administration of the Plan.” Id. at 366 n.3. Thus, the defendants in
Herdrich were fiduciaries concerning claims and plan assets, bringing them under the purview of
ERISA in these areas. See id. at 370-71.
109. MCOs have been deemed fiduciaries in other, related contexts. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of Shea, see supra notes 83-96 and
accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
111. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 380.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) provides in part:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and –
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
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fiduciaries must act “solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries” and for the “exclusive purpose” of “providing benefits” and
“defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”113 Courts and
commentators have labeled this the “exclusive benefit rule.” Courts have
interpreted these requirements as a codification of the duty of loyalty
imposed by the common law of trusts.114
Despite the absolute wording of ERISA, courts have not interpreted the
exclusive benefit rule as a blanket prohibition on all conflicting interests.115
For example, in Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Company,116 the Seventh Circuit
held that it did not constitute a conflict of interest for corporate officers to
serve on the plan administration committee, despite the fact that the benefits
were paid directly from the company’s earnings.117
The conflict of interest in Herdrich was more significant than in
Chalmers. In Chalmers, although the benefits were paid from the company’s
earnings, plan administration decisions did not affect the personal finances of
plan administrators.118 In Herdrich, by contrast, the physician incentives
created a conflict of interest by juxtaposing the medical interest of the patient
with the financial self-interest of the physician. When plan administration
decisions, such as when to approve diagnosis, treatment, and referral options,
interconnect too closely with the physicians’ self-interest, these decisions
violate the exclusive benefit rule.
3. Loss to the Plan
ERISA allows either a participant or beneficiary of a plan to bring an
action against fiduciaries who breach their duty to the plan.119 Through this
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
113. See id.
114. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996); Eccles, supra note 104, at 16.
115. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1988) (arguing that the exclusive benefit rule should be
“on the list of ERISA’s major blunders” because it fails to take into account the complexities of
modern pensions and employee welfare benefit programs).
116. 61 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995).
117. See id. at 1344.
118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) provides: “[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA] . . .
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach.” 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994). Furthermore, § 1132(a) allows a civil action to be brought “by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
[ERISA] . . . or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [ERISA] . . . or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a). See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (holding
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action in equity, the beneficiary may recoup monies expended in violation of
ERISA. Because the ERISA fiduciary duties run to the plan and not to the
individual beneficiaries,120 a cause of action brought by a beneficiary is on
behalf of the plan. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the violation resulted in
a loss to the plan.
When beneficiaries are denied medical benefits because of the breach of
fiduciary duty, the plan suffers a loss in the cost of the supplementary
medical expenses.121 Through the sponsor’s contract with the MCO,
beneficiaries are entitled to receive medical benefits. When those benefits are
denied or delayed long enough to cause injury, the plan suffers a loss in the
amount of the services that should have been provided. For example, Cynthia
Herdrich’s plan suffered a loss equivalent to the amount that her MCO would
have spent in supplying her with adequate, timely diagnosis and treatment of
her appendicitis.122
IV. CONCLUSION
Physician incentives to limit care may create a powerful tool for MCOs to
shift the risks of health care to physicians and decrease health care
expenditures. Unfortunately, such incentives place physicians in a conflict
between their financial self-interest and the best interests of their patients.
This creates a danger that both individual patient care and the standard of
care in general will decline. When physician incentives are excessive, the
resulting conflict of interest breaches not only an ethical duty, but a legal
duty as well.
Participants and beneficiaries of a health care plan governed by ERISA
need the protection of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action against
MCOs creating unduly high incentives to limit care. While a state-law
medical malpractice claim may compensate the plaintiff for a single
erroneous medical decision, the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
protects all participants and beneficiaries from a flawed decision-making
process.
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized this cause of action in Herdrich.
“[t]here can be no disagreement. . . that § [1132(a)] authorizes a beneficiary to bring an action against
a fiduciary who has violated § [1109].”
120. See, e.g., Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1992).
121. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 380 (7th Cir 1998).
122. See id. “[I]n paragraph 13 of her complaint, Herdrich alleges that as a result of the
defendants’ actions, the Plan was deprived of the supplemental medical expense payment amounts in
controversy. We thus hold that she has alleged with sufficient clarity that the Plan suffered a loss as a
result of the defendants’ actions.” Id.
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That decision established that MCOs constitute fiduciaries with respect to
their beneficiaries, that excessive incentives can amount to a breach of their
duty, and that individual beneficiaries have a cause of action to recover the
loss to the plan. This cause of action provides a powerful tool to protect the
public from unchecked experimentation by the managed care industry.
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